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Missouri and Indiana Lay an Egg: Why the 
Latest Attempt at Invalidating State Factory 
Farm Regulations Must Fail 
Louis Cholden-Brown
At the end of 2017, two original jurisdiction cases addressing 
the authority of states to regulate the treatment of farm animals 
were filed at the Supreme Court.1 Overlapping, but not identical, 
groups of thirteen States challenged California and Massachusetts 
laws banning the sale of eggs, as well as pork and veal in 
Massachusetts, raised in conditions deemed cruel by the defendant 
States as violative of the Commerce Clause.  
These dual challenges, which raise unique questions of 
original jurisdiction and standing with which this Article does 
not concern itself, are but the latest in a series of cases seeking to 
restrict state and local regulation of animal welfare.2 As with 
prior attempts, the litigants misconstrue the current thrust of 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the legitimacy of 
state action to limit its complicity in the spread of disease and 
moral degradation. Contrary to their invitation, given the broad 
ambit of the police power and the ill-suitedness of the judiciary to 
weigh competing local interests and out-of-state burdens, in the 
absence of discriminatory intent, existing regulatory conflict or 
inescapable effects on prices or practices, the Court is compelled 
to uphold such statutes. 
This Article begins in Part I by addressing the current 
conception of the dormant Commerce Clause and its retrenchment, 
before discussing prior federal litigation concerning subnational 
laws governing animal food products deemed cruel locally and their 
 Senior Advisor, New York City 2019 Charter Revision Commission. I am indebted 
to the many colleagues who first alerted me to these statutes and collaborated in the early 
phases of the research that became this Article as well as my vegetarian family who were 
a constant source of support despite never understanding why I was writing about “meat.” 
The views expressed represent mine alone and are not attributable to any institution or 
organization with which I am previously or presently affiliated. 
1 Motion For Leave To File Bill Of Complaint, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148 (U.S. 
Dec. 4, 2017); Motion For Leave To File A Bill Of Complaint, Indiana v. Massachusetts, No. 
22O149 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017). 
2 See Ernesto Hernández-López, Sustainable Food and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 549, 550 (2018). 
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universal finding of no dormant Commerce Clause conflict in 
Part II. Parts III and IV in turn chart the passage of the 
California and Massachusetts statutes respectively, as well as 
the dormant Commerce Clause arguments presently before the 
Court. Part V briefly reflects upon the argument advanced by the 
federal government in response to Calls for the Views of the 
Solicitor General (CSVGs) in the two cases. Part VI closes by 
implicating why, when faced with nondiscriminatory laws such 
as these predicated on legitimate, albeit unquantifiable, local 
interests, the Court should decline to engage in benefits 
balancing and uphold the ordinances as rationally related to 
territorial interests. 
I. DORMANT ELEMENTS OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .”3
In addition, courts have “long interpreted the Commerce Clause as 
an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a 
conflicting federal statute.”4 This implicit restraint is often referred to 
as the dormant, or negative, Commerce Clause.5 The “fundamental 
objective” of the dormant Commerce Clause is to protect the national 
market from “preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its 
residents or resident competitors.”6 Therefore, a statute “motivated
by simple economic protectionism” that “discriminates on its face
against interstate commerce” is “subject to a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity which can only be overcome by a showing that the State 
has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.”7 In this 
dormant Commerce Clause context, discrimination “simply means 
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests 
that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”8 However, the 
Supreme Court “never has articulated clear criteria for deciding 
when proof of a discriminatory purpose and/or effect is sufficient 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
4 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338 (2007) (internal citation omitted). 
5 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997). 
6 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Tracy, 519 U.S. at 299) (internal quotation omitted). 
7 United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 338–39 (emphasis added) (internal citations and 
quotation omitted). This per se rule is motivated by a belief that “when ‘the burden of 
state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the 
operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state 
are affected.’” Id. at 345 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767–68 
n.2 (1945)). The “abstract possibility” of the existence of less discriminatory means is 
insufficient to render a statute unconstitutional as the state “is not required to develop 
new and unproven means of protection . . . .” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986) 
(internal citations and quotation omitted). 
8 Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
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for a state or local law to be discriminatory.”9 “Indeed, the cases 
in this area seem quite inconsistent”10 and Justice Scalia has 
observed “once one gets beyond facial discrimination our 
negative-Commerce-Clause jurisprudence becomes (and long has 
been) a quagmire.”11 The Supreme Court has considered and 
rejected the argument that a “statute is discriminatory because it 
will apply most often to out-of-state entities” in a market 
comprised of more out-of-state than in-state participants.12 As 
early as thirty years ago, some argued a “court should strike 
down a state law if and only if it finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that protectionist purpose on the part of the legislators 
contributed substantially to the adoption of the law or any 
feature of the law,”13 and in recent years, the “zone of 
presumptive illegality”14 has narrowed to only preclude 
intentional protectionism.15
9 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 444–45
(4th ed. 2011). 
10 Id. at 445. 
11 W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(internal quotation omitted). Justice Scalia was a prolific critic of the dormant Commerce 
Clause at large. See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The fundamental problem with our negative Commerce 
Clause cases is that the Constitution does not contain a negative Commerce Clause.”). As 
are Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. See, e.g.,Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 614–17 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Direct Mktg. 
Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
whole field in which we are asked to operate today—dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause 
doctrine—might be said to be an artifact of judicial precedent.”).  
12 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
13 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1148 (1986). 
14 Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. L. REV.
255, 277 (2017). 
15 See, e.g., C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (“The 
central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws 
whose object is local economic protectionism” because these are the “laws that would 
excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to 
prevent”); United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 338 (2007) (“Discriminatory laws motivated by ‘simple economic protectionism’ are 
subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalidity . . . .”’ (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978))). It should be noted that arguably City of Philadelphia
stands for a different principle. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (“[W]here simple 
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity 
has been erected.”) (emphasis added); see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 
U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (holding that the dormant Commerce Clause “prohibits economic 
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic 
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors”) (emphasis added); Dep’t of Revenue of 
Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“The modern law of what 
has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about ‘economic 
protectionism that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests 
by burdening out-of-state competitors.’”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
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By contrast, in what has become known as the Pike16
balancing test, when a statute “regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest” with only incidental 
effects on interstate commerce, “it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits.”17 A putative benefit need not be 
explicitly stated in the challenged legislation to be legitimate,18
and neither its wisdom nor effectiveness, nor whether the 
benefits “actually come into being” are of any consideration.19
Absent “discriminating against articles of commerce coming 
from outside the State,” “the States retain authority under their 
general police powers to regulate matters of ‘legitimate local 
concern,’ even though interstate commerce may be affected.”20
States possess a “right to impose even burdensome regulations in 
the interest of local health and safety” so long as the regulations 
are not attempts to “advance their own commercial interests.”21
The authority to regulate for the public health, safety, morals or 
welfare is broad,22 and the power “to prescribe regulations which 
shall prevent the production within its borders of impure foods” 
is well established.23 “[A]rticles as would spread disease and 
pestilence” are not within the protection of the Commerce Clause 
regardless of such regulations incidentally affecting interstate 
commerce, “when the object of the regulation is not to that end, 
but is a legitimate attempt to protect the people of the state.”24
The welfare of all animals, not merely those bound for consumption, 
16 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
17 Id.
18 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 348, 354 (1951). 
19 Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 313 (1st Cir. 2005). 
20 Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (internal citation omitted). 
21 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). 
22 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (West, Westlaw through Sept. 2018) (granting 
cities in Illinois “the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, 
morals and welfare”); TUCSON CODE ch. VII § 1(32) (Supp. 2016) (granting mayor and 
council authority to “adopt and enforce by ordinance all such measures . . . expedient or 
necessary for the promotion and protection of the health, comfort, safety, life, welfare and 
property of the inhabitants of the city, the preservation of peace and good order, the 
promotion of public morals”); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“It 
belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police powers of the state, and 
to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of 
the public morals, the public health, or the public safety.”); Cresenzi Bird Imps. v. New 
York, 658 F. Supp. 1441, 1447 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognizing the state’s “interest in 
cleansing its markets of commerce which the Legislature finds to be unethical”); Robert J. 
Delahunty & Antonio F. Perez, Moral Communities or a Market State: The Supreme Court’s 
Vision of the Police Power in the Age of Globalization, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 637, 676 (2005) (“The 
States’ authority to pursue specifically moral objectives is deeply rooted in the American 
constitutional tradition. Indeed, it is one of the fundamental features of our federalism.”). 
23 Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 (1915). 
24 Id. at 59–60. 
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is commonly understood to be within that power 25 and, in one series 
of examples, federal courts have uniformly found the regulation of 
animal welfare standards for animals for sale as pets do not conflict 
with the dormant Commerce Clause.26
Despite its name, “incidental burdens” are any “burdens on 
interstate commerce that exceed the burdens on intrastate 
commerce.”27 The Commerce Clause “protects the interstate 
market, not particular interstate firms”28 and individual losses or 
businesses restructuring suffered by particular firms do not 
constitute sufficient burden. Stated otherwise, “the statute, at a 
minimum, must impose a burden on interstate commerce that is 
qualitatively or quantitatively different from that imposed on 
25 See 3B C.J.S. Animals § 198 (2018) (“Statutory provisions prohibiting cruelty to 
animals are sustainable as a valid exercise of the police power.”) (footnote omitted); Cavel 
Int’l v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 557 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[s]tates have a 
legitimate interest in prolonging the lives of animals that their population happens to 
like” and that “a state is permitted, within reason, to express disgust at what people do 
with the dead”); DeHart v. Town of Austin, 39 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The 
regulation of animals has long been recognized as part of the historic police power of the 
States.”); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, No. 
17-3163, 2018 WL 3655854, at *5 (7th Cir. June 25, 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]nimal welfare affects human welfare. Many people feel disgust, humiliation, or 
shame when animals or their remains are poorly treated.”). 
26 Park Pet Shop v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2017); N.Y. Pet Welfare 
Ass’n v. City of New York, 850 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]here is no need to consider the 
. . . Pike balancing test. Because the Sourcing Law imposes no incidental burdens on 
interstate commerce, it cannot impose any that are clearly excessive in relation to its local 
benefits, and therefore survives scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.”); Mo. Pet 
Breeders Ass’n v. County of Cook, 119 F. Supp. 3d 865, 875–76 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Puppies ‘N 
Love v. City of Phoenix, 116 F. Supp. 3d 971, 996 (D. Ariz. 2015) (“The Ordinance is not an 
act of economic protectionism. It is a legitimate attempt to curb the problems associated 
with the inhumane treatment of animals and local dog homelessness and euthanasia. 
Plaintiffs’ claim that the Ordinance violates the dormant Commerce Clause fails as a matter 
of law.”); Perfect Puppy v. City of E. Providence, 98 F. Supp. 3d 408, 415–18 (D.R.I. 2015). 
Contra Six Kingdoms Enters. v. City of El Paso, No. EP-10-CV-485-KC, 2011 WL 65864, at 
*8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2011) (“By limiting the price of puppies to an amount that sellers of 
puppies from distant states cannot meet, the ordinance plainly has a discriminatory impact 
upon out-of-state interests.”). 
27 N.Y. State Trawlers Ass’n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1308 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471–72 (1981)); see also Automated 
Salvage Transp. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., 155 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Where a 
regulation does not have this disparate impact on interstate commerce, then ‘we must 
conclude that . . . [it] has not imposed any “incidental burdens” on interstate commerce 
that “are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”’ Thus, the minimum 
showing required to succeed in a Commerce Clause challenge to a state regulation is that 
it have a disparate impact on interstate commerce. The fact that it may otherwise affect 
commerce is not sufficient.’”); Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1015 
(9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “incidental burdens” on interstate commerce include 
disruption of interstate travel and shipping due to lack of uniformity in state laws, 
impacts on commerce beyond the borders of the state, or burdens that fall more heavily on 
out-of-state interests). 
28 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (“[T]he Commerce Clause 
[does not] protect[ ] the particular structure or methods of operation in a retail market.”).  
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intrastate commerce”29 such as to make the statute “unreasonable or 
irrational.”30 If no such unequal burden is shown, a reviewing court 
need not proceed further.31 Unless a plaintiff demonstrates that the 
statute imposes some burden on interstate commerce that is different 
from the burden imposed on intrastate commerce, courts should 
refrain entirely from weighing a statute’s costs and benefits.32
The competency or propriety of courts undertaking these 
inquiries has been much maligned. The Fourth Circuit has 
criticized the Pike balancing test as “often too soggy to properly 
cabin the judicial inquiry or effectively prevent the district court 
from assuming a super-legislative role;”33 while on the Tenth 
Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch called Pike “a pretty grand, even 
‘ineffable,’ all-things-considered sort of test, one requiring judges 
(to attempt) to compare wholly incommensurable goods for wholly 
29 National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Park 
Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (“Pike balancing is triggered only when the challenged law 
discriminates against interstate commerce in practical application.”) (emphasis in original). 
30 Alaska Airlines v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 1991). A statute 
is “unreasonable or irrational . . . where the asserted benefits of the statute are in fact 
illusory or relate to goals that evidence an impermissible favoritism of in-state industry 
over out-of-state industry.” Id. See also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 
U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n v. Holshouser, 408 F. Supp. 857, 
861 (E.D.N.C. 1976). 
31 Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 109. “Pike balancing is triggered only when the challenged law 
discriminates against interstate commerce in practical application. Pike is not the default 
standard of review for any state or local law that affects interstate commerce.” Park Pet 
Shop, 872 F.3d at 502. “[U]nless the challenged law discriminates against interstate 
commerce in practical effect, the dormant Commerce Clause does not come into play and 
Pike balancing does not apply.” Id. See also Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of 
Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a default application of Pike and 
holding “the dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause does not replace the rational-basis inquiry 
with a ‘broader, all-weather, be-reasonable vision of the Constitution’”). 
32 See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 360 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I would abandon the Pike-balancing enterprise altogether and leave these 
quintessentially legislative judgments with the branch to which the Constitution assigns 
them.”); see also United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (noting that the Pike balancing test was “reserved” for laws that have 
incidental effects on interstate commerce, but finding “it unnecessary to decide whether 
the ordinances impose any incidental burden on interstate commerce because any 
arguable burden does not exceed the public benefits of the ordinances”); Exxon Corp., 437 
U.S. at 125–26 (“Plainly, the Maryland statute [prohibiting producer or refiner of 
petroleum products from operating retail service station within the State] does not 
discriminate against interstate goods, nor does it favor local producers and refiners. Since 
Maryland’s entire gasoline supply flows in interstate commerce and since there are no 
local producers or refiners, such claims of disparate treatment between interstate and 
local commerce would be meritless. . . . The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls 
on some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination 
against interstate commerce.”); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 
200, 209 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This balancing test, however, does not invite courts to 
second-guess legislatures by estimating the probable costs and benefits of the statute, nor is 
it within the competency of courts to do so.”); Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1130 (finding that the 
dormant Commerce Clause does not “authorize a [court to undertake] a comprehensive 
review of the law’s benefits, free of any obligation to accept the legislature’s judgment”). 
33 Colon Health Ctrs. of Am. v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 546 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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different populations (measuring the burdens on out-of-staters 
against the benefits to in-staters).”34 Justice Scalia explained this 
dilemma at greater length in Davis:
The burdens and the benefits are always incommensurate, and cannot 
be placed on the opposite balances of a scale without assigning a 
policy-based weight to each of them. It is a matter not of weighing 
apples against apples, but of deciding whether three apples are better 
than six tangerines. . . . [Y]ou cannot decide which interest “outweighs” 
the other without deciding which interest is more important to you.35
There is “no clear line between these two strands of analysis” and 
several cases, including Pike itself, that have purported to apply 
the undue burden test “turned in whole or in part on the 
discriminatory character of the challenged state regulations.”36
This has led some courts to “wonder just what work Pike does”37
and several scholars suggest that the Supreme Court has “sub 
silentio” repudiated the balancing test by failing to invalidate any 
laws under it since 198238 and “burden review has decayed into 
minimal rational basis review at best.”39
When a state “project[s] its legislation into” other jurisdictions40
and “directly controls” conduct wholly beyond its borders, whether to 
punish, reward or otherwise influence, and irrespective of whether it 
is discriminatory or its extraterritorial reach was intended, the 
statute is per se invalid.41 Despite the doctrine often being premised 
on the possibility of inconsistent regulatory regimes if more than one 
state were to regulate in this space, the actual existence of a conflict 
34 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015). 
35 Davis, 553 U.S. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia, never at a loss for quips, has 
also compared this inquiry to “judging whether a particular line is longer than a 
particular rock is heavy.” Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters. 486 U.S. 888, 897 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
36 General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997). 
37 Cavel Int’l v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 2007). Some courts, citing a 
footnote in Tracy, 519 U.S. at 298 n.12, have suggested that Pike is only violated when a 
“genuinely nondiscriminatory” state law “undermine[s] a compelling need for national 
uniformity in regulation.” See LSP Transmission Holdings v. Lange, No. CV 17-4490 
(DWF/HB), 2018 WL 3075976, at *9 (D. Minn. June 21, 2018) (finding “[t]he Supreme Court 
[in this footnote] also noted the narrow application of the Pike test”); Owner-Operator Indep. 
Drivers Ass’n v. Urbach, 718 N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (App. Div. 2000) (“[I]t is incumbent upon 
plaintiffs to identify some prohibited interference with interstate commerce under the Pike
undue burden test to obviate the need to establish that their commercial interests have 
received disparate treatment from those of similarly situated intrastate operators.”). But see 
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, 401 F.3d 560, 572 (4th Cir. 2005). 
38 Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 493 (2008). 
39 Francis, supra note 14, at 277. 
40 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 
(1986) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)). 
41 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1994).  
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is not a prerequisite for its application.42 However, as changes to 
the global economy blur the line between intrastate and interstate 
transactions, the doctrine has atrophied.  
Extraterritoriality’s demise is in part attributable to its birth 
during an earlier phase of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
where the Court found a regulation of interstate commerce 
permissible based on whether it was a “direct” or “indirect” 
regulation;43 the Court’s furnishing of alternative grounds for its 
holding in MITE and Healy are a recognition of such by its 
members.44 As the Court’s conception of states’ territories have 
grown more fluid in other areas of law, such as personal 
jurisdiction45 and choice-of-law,46 to reflect the increasingly 
interconnected world, some have called for it to do so here. Justice 
Gorsuch’s 2015 decision, while still a judge of the Tenth Circuit, in 
Energy and Environment Legal Institute v. Epel,47 labeled the 
extraterritoriality doctrine “the most dormant doctrine in 
dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause jurisprudence”48 and no longer 
binding.49 He suggested that rather than constituting “a distinct 
line” of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Baldwin and 
its progeny were examples of the anti-discrimination rule that was 
yet to solidify.50 Similarly, Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit has 
42 Barbara O. Bruckmann, The Case for a Commerce Clause Challenge to State 
Antitrust Laws Banning Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
391, 415 (2012) (“[D]irect regulatory conflict appears a sufficient, but not necessary, 
condition for demonstrating extraterritorial regulation.”). 
43 Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A 
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 996 (2013). 
44 Healy, 491 U.S. at 340 (striking down a statute because it “discriminate[d] against 
brewers . . . [who] engaged in interstate commerce”). In his Healy concurrence, Justice 
Scalia labeled the extraterritoriality doctrine “both dubious and unnecessary to decide the 
present cases.” Id. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring). Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 
(1982) (finding the statute was “a direct restraint on interstate commerce” that would 
have thoroughly stifled the ability of out-of-state corporations to make tender offers).  
45 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (finding that personal 
jurisdiction can be established with a nexus-oriented approach). 
46 See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why California’s 
Progressive Global Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not Violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 454–55 (2015). 
47 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015). 
48 Id. at 1170. See IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 29 n.27 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(“Extraterritoriality has been the dormant branch of the dormant Commerce Clause.”). 
This outlook is also shared by scholars. See, e.g., Denning, supra note 43, at 1006 
(“[E]xtraterritoriality is, for all intents and purposes, dead.”). 
49 See Epel, 793 F.3d at 1173–75. In Epel, the court stated:  
[S]tate laws setting non-price standards for products sold in-state (standards 
concerning, for example, quality, labeling, health, or safety) may be amenable 
to scrutiny under the generally applicable Pike balancing test, or scrutinized 
for traces of discrimination under Philadelphia, but the Court has never 
suggested they trigger near-automatic condemnation under Baldwin.
Id. at 1173. 
50 Id. at 1173.  
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suggested that “[t]he extraterritoriality doctrine . . . is a relic of 
the old world with no useful role to play in the new,”51 whose 
elimination as a freestanding prohibition would not alter case 
outcomes.52 There presently exists a debate amongst the circuits 
regarding whether Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of 
America v. Walsh,53 where the Court referred to the doctrine not 
as “extraterritoriality” but rather “[t]he rule that was applied in 
Baldwin and Healy,”54 limited its principle to price affirmation 
statutes.55 Others have suggested that “the extraterritoriality 
doctrine should apply only when the state directly regulates 
out-of-state conduct or the state regulates in-state conduct in 
such a way that it has the inescapable practical effect of 
regulating out-of-state conduct in which the state has no 
corresponding interest.”56
51 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring). 
52 Id. at 380–81 (arguing that extraterritoriality was not essential to the holdings in 
Healey, Brown-Forman, Edgar, or Baldwin).
53 Pharm. Research & Mfr. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003). 
54 Id.
55 See Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 
951 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Healy and Baldwin are not applicable to a statute that does not 
dictate the price of a product and does not ‘t[ie] the price of its in-state products to 
out-of-state prices.’”) (internal citation omitted); Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 
794 F.3d 1136, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding “even when state law has significant 
extraterritorial effects, it passes Commerce Clause muster when, as here, those effects 
result from the regulation of in-state conduct” and distinguishing Sam Francis Found. 
v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015), as “invalidating a . . . statute that ‘facially 
regulates . . . wholly outside the State’s borders’”) (internal citation omitted); IMS Health 
Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the Supreme Court “has only 
struck down two related types of statutes on extraterritoriality grounds” which include 
“price affirmation statutes” and “statutes that ‘force an out-of-state merchant to seek 
regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another’”) (internal 
citation omitted). But see Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 670 (4th Cir. 
2018) (“The Supreme Court’s statement does not suggest that ‘[t]he rule that was applied 
in Baldwin and Healy’ applies exclusively to ‘price control or price affirmation statutes.’ 
Instead, the Court’s statement emphasizes that the extraterritoriality principle is violated 
if the state law at issue ‘regulate[s] the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its 
express terms or by its inevitable effect.’”) (internal citation omitted); North Dakota 
v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding “[t]he district court correctly 
noted the Supreme Court has never so limited the [extraterritoriality] doctrine [to price 
control], and indeed has applied it more broadly,” but declining to address claims that 
extraterritorial legislation should be analyzed under the Pike balancing test or deemed 
“per se invalid”). This debate predates Walsh. See, e.g., Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n 
v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 659 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Although cases like Healy and Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. involved price affirmation statutes, the principles set forth in these 
decisions are not limited to that context.”). 
56 Schmitt, supra note 46, at 449; see also N.Y. Pet Welfare Ass’n v. City of New 
York, 850 F.3d 79, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The Commerce Clause, however, does not void 
every law that causes behavior to change in other states. Rather, the measure of 
extraterritoriality is whether the Sourcing Law ‘inescapably require[s]’ breeders to 
operate on the City’s terms even when doing business elsewhere.” (internal citations 
omitted)); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] decision 
to abandon the state’s market rests entirely with individual manufacturers based on the 
opportunity cost of capital, their individual production costs, and what the demand in the 
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II. NO COMMERCE IN ANIMAL CRUELTY
Litigation concerning foie gras bans in Chicago and 
California is illustrative of how the courts have addressed 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to statutes governing the 
sale of food produced through animal cruelty.57 On April 26, 
2006, as part of the omnibus budget bill, the Chicago City 
Council enacted legislation prohibiting the sale of foie gras in 
“[a]ll food dispensing establishments.”58 The preamble to the 
statute reiterated that under the Illinois constitution, the City 
“may exercise any power and perform any function relating to its 
government and affairs including protecting the health, safety 
and welfare of its citizens” and by “ensuring the ethical 
treatment of animals, who are the source of the food offered in 
our restaurants, the City of Chicago is able to continue to offer 
the best in dining experiences.”59 Immediately after adoption, the 
Illinois Restaurant Association and Allen’s New American Cafe 
sued in state court.60 They contended that: 
[T]he Ordinance has nothing to do with health, safety, environmental 
issues or governmental revenue generation. Nor does it fit into 
traditional areas of state governmental interest in food regulation 
since there is no tradition in Illinois of banning, on morality and 
reputational grounds, food that has already been found safe on the 
federal level for human consumption.61
The district court found for Chicago and held that the law did not 
discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect since 
it did “not force out-of-state foie gras producers or distributors to do 
anything.”62 The court found that “the dormant Commerce Clause 
state will bear. Because none of these variables is controlled by the state in this case, we 
cannot say that the choice to stay or leave has been made for manufacturers by the state 
legislature, as the Commerce Clause would prohibit.”); cf. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669 (limiting 
extraterritoriality doctrine to instances where a statute “by its express terms or inevitable 
effect” regulates extraterritorially). 
57 See generally Kristin Cook, The Inhumanity of Foie Gras Production—Perhaps 
California and Chicago Have the Right Idea, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 263, 263, 269–72 
(2007); Rafi Youatt, Power, Pain, and the Interspecies Politics of Foie Gras, 65 POL. RES.
Q. 346, 346 (2011). 
58 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 7-39-001–005 (2006), Amendment of Title 7, Chapter 
39 of Muni. Code of Chicago by Addition of New Sections 001 and 005 Prohibiting Sale of 
Foie Gras by Food Establishments Before the Comm. on Health, (Apr. 26, 2006) (repealed 
May 14, 2008). 
59 MARK CARP, THE FOIE GRAS WARS: HOW A 5,000-YEAR-OLD DELICACY INSPIRED 
THE WORLD'S FIERCEST FOOD FIGHT 127 (2009). 
60 After the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge, the city removed the case to federal court. See Ill. Rest Ass’n v. City of 
Chicago, No. 06 C 7014, 2007 WL 541926, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2007). 
61 Plaintiffs’ Surreply Addressing New United States Supreme Court Decision, at 3, 
Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (No. 06 C 7014), 
2007 WL 1973283, at *3. 
62 Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
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applies to [facially] nondiscriminatory laws only where the law has 
some sort of discriminatory effect or when judicial intervention is 
necessary to promote national uniformity and thereby prevent 
discrimination,”63 or citing the words of the Seventh Circuit in 
National Paint,64 “[n]o disparate treatment, no disparate impact, 
no problem under the dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause,”65 and 
therefore the court was not required to apply Pike.66 The existence 
of the Pike balancing test was not an excuse for the court to 
engage in “‘general-purpose balancing’” and the court must look 
for “‘discrimination rather than for baleful effects.’”67 The court did 
acknowledge however that its decision was “in tension with other 
Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit cases which do not delve into 
the details of the dormant Commerce Clause.”68 Feeling that the 
ordinance infringed on freedom of choice and made a national 
embarrassment of Chicago,69 the Council repealed the law just 
over two years later on May 14, 2008,70 while an appeal was 
pending before the Seventh Circuit.71 Illinois Restaurant 
Association found that the regulation of foie gras was not a subject 
requiring national uniformity and by treating in-state and 
interstate interests the same, the dormant Commerce Clause was 
not implicated and balancing was not warranted.72
The California statute, while older in origin, remains the 
subject of litigation. In 2004, California adopted new provisions 
63 Id. at 905. The Court also noted that “United Haulers . . . is yet another case that 
recites the Pike standard in connection with a facially nondiscriminatory law but, in the 
same breath, looks to whether the law has any discriminatory effects.” Id. See also 
Francis, supra note 14, at 298 (“Analysis of whether a subject ‘requires’ a uniform 
national standard . . . often seems to be a euphemism for burden review, rooted in a 
practical economic assessment of the consequences of unilateral state regulation.”); Ass’n 
des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 952 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“[E]xamples of ‘courts finding uniformity necessary’ fall into the categories of 
‘transportation’ or ‘professional sports league[s].’” (internal citation omitted)). 
64 Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1132 (7th Cir. 1995). 
65 Id. 
66 See id.
67 Ill. Rest. Ass’n, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (quoting Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131). 
68 Id. at 903–04 (referencing Alliant Energy Corp., Or. Waste Sys., and Clover Leaf).
69 See Nick Fox, Chicago Overturns Foie Gras Ban, N.Y. TIMES: DINER’S J. (May 14, 
2008), http://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/chicago-overturns-foie-gras-ban/ 
[http://perma.cc/949N-TE7A] (“[T]he ban has been a source of embarrassment for the city 
and the repeal comes as residents have accused officials of trying to micromanage people’s 
lives . . . .”); see also Phil Vettel, Hold the Jokes the Rest of Yous: Foie Gras Back on Menus,
CHI. TRIB. (May 18, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-05-18/news/0805170435_1_foie-
gras-terrine-chicagoans [http://perma.cc/C6E9-JKBG] (“Ald. Bernard Stone (50th) quickly 
recanted his support of the ban, saying, ‘Anybody who has traveled anywhere in this country 
knows that people are just laughing their heads off at us.’”). 
70 See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 7-39-001–005 (2006) (adopted Apr. 26, 2006),
repealed by Chicago, Ill., Ordinance 2008-2041 (May 14, 2008). 
71 See Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 7014, 2008 WL 8915042, at *1, 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2008). 
72 See Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905–06 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
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of the California Health & Safety Code (sections 25981 and 
25982) which prohibited the practice of force-feeding ducks or 
geese to produce foie gras, as well as the in-state sale of products 
made elsewhere from force-fed fowl.73 On July 2, 2012, the day 
after the state law took effect, Association des Éleveurs de 
Canards et d’Oies du Québec (hereafter “Canadian Farmers”), a 
Canadian nonprofit which raises birds for foie gras, sued the 
state of California (Association des Éleveurs I). The Canadian 
Farmers argued that California’s ban on the sale of foie gras 
violated the extraterritoriality doctrine because “the practical 
effect—and perhaps the very purpose—of section 25982 is to 
project California’s preferred agricultural practices on farmers 
outside the state.”74 They contended that the law imposed a 
burden on the poultry market without any corresponding local 
benefit because “not a single duck or goose in California is 
protected by applying section 25982 to . . . ducks and geese born, 
raised, and slaughtered entirely outside the state.”75 These claims 
were rejected as meritless by both the district court76 and Ninth 
Circuit,77 with the latter observing that “[p]laintiffs give us no 
reason to doubt that the State believed that the sales ban . . . may 
discourage the consumption of products produced by force feeding 
birds and prevent complicity in a practice that is deemed cruel to 
animals.”78 The appellate court declined to conduct an analysis 
under Pike of whether the statute’s benefits were illusory because 
the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a significant burden on 
interstate commerce.79 The law did not prohibit the sale of foie gras, 
merely the most profitable method of production and “‘the dormant 
Commerce Clause does not . . . guarantee [p]laintiffs their preferred 
method of operation.”80 Plaintiffs also “failed to show that the foie 
73 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25981–25982 (West 2018). 
74 Appellants’ Opening Brief at 20, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du 
Québec v. Harris, No. 12-56822, 2012 WL 5915406, at *20 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2012). 
75 Id. at *22. 
76 Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, No. 2:12-CV-05735-
SVW-RZ, 2012 WL 12842942, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012) (“Preventing animal 
cruelty in California is clearly a legitimate state interest . . . and Plaintiffs have presented 
no evidence that Section 25982 is an ineffective means of advancing that goal. Plaintiffs 
have thus failed to raise a serious question that Section 25982’s burden on interstate 
commerce ‘clearly exceeds’ its local benefits.”). 
77 Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 948–52 
(9th Cir. 2013) (observing section 25982 is not discriminatory and does not directly 
regulate or substantially burden interstate commerce). 
78 Id. at 952 (citing Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 
F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that ban on slaughter and sale of horsemeat for 
human consumption may “increase the preservation of horses” by “removing the 
significant monetary incentives”)). 
79 See id. at 951–52 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 
F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
80 Id. at 949 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists, 682 F.3d at 1151).  
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gras market is inherently national or that it requires a uniform 
system of regulation”81 or any existing competing legislation 
indicating balkanization. The Supreme Court “has never 
invalidated a state or local law under the dormant Commerce 
Clause based upon mere speculation about the possibility of 
conflicting legislation.”82 The Supreme Court denied the foie gras 
companies’ petition for certiorari on October 14, 2014.83 Association 
des Eleveurs I found the statute barred how, but not where, an item 
is produced, and therefore Pike balancing was unnecessary.  
Indeed, not a single animal cruelty statute challenged on 
Commerce Clause grounds has been struck down on that basis. This 
includes bans on horsemeat for human consumption upheld by the 
Fifth and Seventh Circuits,84 and the Ninth Circuit decision 
upholding California’s ban on the sale or distribution of shark fins.85
This also includes two statutes arguably regulating production 
methods: A California ban on the slaughter of non-ambulatory 
animals challenged on dormant Commerce Clause grounds but 
81 Id. at 952. 
82 Id. at 951 (quoting S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
83 See Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 135 S. Ct. 398 
(2014) cert. denied. Subsequently, the plaintiffs amended their complaint in the district 
court seeking declaratory relief asserting that section 25982 was preempted by the 
Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du 
Québec v. Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The district court found that 
the PPIA expressly preempted section 25982 and granted the motion for partial summary 
judgment while declining to reach any of the other arguments. See id. at 1147–48. The 
Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated in part, finding that the foie gras statute was not 
preempted by the PPIA expressly or under the doctrines of field or obstacle preemption, 
and remanded the proceedings. See Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec 
v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017). On March 9, 2018, a petition for 
certiorari was docketed by the plaintiffs and a Call for the Views of the Solicitor General 
by the Court was issued on June 18, 2018 to which he responded on December 5, 2018 
recommending denial. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et 
d’Oies du Québecv. Becerra, No. 17A793 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2018); see also Ass’n des Éleveurs de 
Canards et d’Oies du Québecv. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2668 (2018) (mem.), Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae, Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québecv. Becerra, No. 17A793. 
84 See Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V., v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 335 
(5th Cir. 2007); Cavel Int’l v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 544–55 (7th Cir. 2007). 
85 See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2015). 
The court upheld a finding by the district court that “given that the Shark Fin Law is 
facially neutral, and treats all shark fins the same, regardless of their origin, plaintiffs 
have not shown (and cannot show) that the Shark Fin Law either regulates 
extraterritorially, or discriminates in favor of in-state interests.” Chinatown 
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Brown, No. C 12-3759 PJH, 2013 WL 60919, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
2, 2013). Finding that the animal cruelty and the health and conservation benefits of the 
law outweighed the insignificant commercial burden on interstate commerce, the court held 
in the absence of a significant burden, it would be inappropriate for them “to determine [its] 
constitutionality . . . based on our assessment of the benefits of th[e] law [ ] and the State’s 
wisdom in adopting [it],” or the availability of less-burdensome alternatives. Chinatown 
Neighborhood Ass’n, 794 F.3d at 1147 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians 
v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Ninth Circuit further discounted 
the extraterritorial claims saying such effects only are violative when states attempt to fix 
prices beyond their borders. Id. at 1146. 
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ultimately struck down by the Court for Federal Meat Inspection Act 
(FMIA) preemption,86 and a New York statute prohibiting the sale of 
wild birds not raised in captivity upheld by the Second Circuit.87
III. PROPOSITION 2 AND AB 1437: CALIFORNIA EGGS ON
THE STATES 
After a voter-initiated initiative campaign, on November 4, 
2008, California, by a margin of 63.5% to 36.5%,88 passed 
Proposition 2 which required “calves raised for veal, egg-laying 
hens and pregnant pigs be confined only in ways that allow these 
animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn 
around freely” by 2015.89 In 2010, the California legislature 
enacted AB 1437 which banned the sale within the state of eggs 
from out-of-state farms unless those farmers subjected themselves 
to the same confinement standards.90 In adopting the latter, the 
legislature, in their stated purpose, sought to “protect California 
consumers from the deleterious, health, safety, and welfare effects 
of the sale and consumption of eggs derived from egg-laying hens 
that are exposed to significant stress and many result in increased 
exposure to disease pathogens including salmonella.”91
Even before taking effect, Proposition 2 and AB 1437 spawned 
numerous lawsuits challenging the ordinances.92 In 2012, the first 
86 See Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 468 (2012). 
87 See Cresenzi Bird Imps. v. New York, 831 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming the 
opinion below). “New York has a legitimate interest in regulating its local market 
conditions which lead, in a short causal chain, to the unjustifiable and senseless suffering 
and death of thousands of captured wild birds.” Cresenzi Bird Imps. v. New York, 658 F. 
Supp. 1441, 1447 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (internal citation omitted). 
88 Votes For And Against November 4, 2008, State Ballot Measures, CAL. BOARD OF 
ELECTIONS, http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2008-general/7_votes_for_against.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/MTD7-Z4Y3]; see also Cal. Sec’y of State, Prevention of Farm Animal 
Cruelty Act, in CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION 
GUIDE 16 (2008), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov-2008-principal.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ED6V-EKNK]. 
89 Attorney General, Prop 2 Standards For Confining Farm Animals. Initiative Statute,
CAL. GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 4, 2008), http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/title-sum/prop2-
title-sum.htm [http://perma.cc/FZJ8-BA5W]; see also Letter from Joe Ramsey to Toni Melton, 
Initiative Coordinator, Office of the Attorney Gen., Request for Title and Summary for Proposed 
Initiative (Aug. 9, 2007), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/initiatives/2007-08-09_07-0041_Initiative.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/DCD3-CNS7]. 
90 2010 Cal. Stat. 51. On November 6, 2018, California voters approved Proposition 12 
replacing the Proposition 2 size restrictions based on animal behavior with specific numbers of 
square feet and ban the sale of non-conforming veal and pork as of 2020. California Election 
Results, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/ 
us/elections/results-california-elections.html; Letter from Cheri Shankar, to Ashley Johansson, 
Initiative Coordinator, Request For Title and Summary of Proposed Initiative (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/17-0026%20%28Animal%20Cruelty%29_0.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2FC7-2YUP].
91 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25995(e) (West 2018).  
92 See, e.g., JS West Milling Co. v. State, No. 10-CECG-04225 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2011) 
(dismissing on ripeness grounds the allegations that Proposition 2 was unconstitutionally 
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federal suit was brought by a California egg farmer, William 
Cramer, who challenged the Proposition 2 cage size requirement 
as unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, because it did not identify satisfactory cage 
specifications,93 and as violating the Commerce Clause by forcing the 
closure and relocation of California egg farmers which in turn would 
lead to increased consumer prices and disruption of the national corn 
feed market.94 The district court dismissed the claims, finding that 
the law was not vague but rather established a clear test that “does 
not require the law enforcement officer to have the investigative 
acumen of Columbo”95 and that Cramer’s “factual allegations are 
wholly insufficient to raise his [Commerce Clause] claim above the 
speculative level”96 since, as the plaintiff acknowledged, “the 
prevention of animal cruelty is a legitimate state interest.”97
After Cramer appealed, the Ninth Circuit, without hearing oral 
arguments, affirmed the motion to dismiss in a brief, unpublished 
February 2015 opinion which only addressed the void for vagueness 
claim and made no mention of the Commerce Clause.98
In February 2014, Missouri filed suit,99 alleging AB 1437 
violated the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United 
States Constitution and were further “expressly and implicitly 
preempted by the federal Egg Products Inspection Act” (EPIA).100
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing in October 
2014, finding it “patently clear” the plaintiffs were “bringing this 
action on behalf of a subset of each state’s egg farmers and their 
purported right to participate in the laws that govern them, not on 
behalf of each state’s population generally.”101 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal, finding that “[t]he complaint contain[ed] no 
vague because it did not specify compliant cage dimensions); Ass’n of Calif. Egg Farms 
v. State, No. 12-CECG-03695-DSB, 2013 WL 9668707, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 
2013) (finding that definition of confinement standards in terms of “animal behaviors 
rather than in square inches” did not make Proposition 2 facially vague). See also, Molly 
L. Wiltshire, Of Eggs and Hens: Pro Bono Opportunities in the Area of Animal Law,
SCHIFF HARDIN (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.schiffhardin.com/insights/publications/2016/of-
eggs-and-hens-pro-bono-opportunities-in-the-area-of-animal-law [http://perma.cc/T39C-JQTV]. 
93 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Cramer v. Brown, (No. CV 
12 - 03130 JFW (JEMx)), 2012 WL 1230649 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2012).  
94 Id. at 6. 
95 Cramer v. Brown, No. CV123130JFWJEMX, 2012 WL 13059699, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 12, 2012). 
96 Id. at *5. 
97 Id. (“[T]he prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, 
starting with the early settlement of the Colonies.” (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 
U.S. 460, 469 (2010))). 
98 See Cramer v. Harris, 591 F. App’x 634, 635 (9th Cir. 2015). 
99 See Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1063 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (five other 
states—Alabama, Kentucky, Iowa, Oklahoma and Nebraska—subsequently joined the suit). 
100 Id. at 1065; 21 U.S.C. § 1031 (2018). 
101 Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 1078. 
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specific allegations about the statewide magnitude of [the alleged 
difficult choices engendered by the law] or the extent to which they 
affect[ed] more than just an ‘identifiable group of individual’ egg 
farmers”102 and “the unavoidable uncertainty of the alleged future 
changes in price ma[de] the alleged injury insufficient for Article III 
standing.”103 A petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme 
Court in May 2017.104
In December 2017, the plaintiff States, with the exception of 
Kentucky, and joined by Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin, filed an 
original jurisdiction action with the Supreme Court.105 The motion 
alleged AB 1437 was motivated by economic protectionism, 
relying at least in part on Governor Schwarzenegger’s signing 
statement: “[b]y ensuring that all eggs sold in California meet the 
requirements of Proposition 2, this bill is good for both California 
egg producers and animal welfare.”106 The plaintiff States contend 
that AB 1437 “has not provided any significant health-and-safety 
benefits to Californians” or other persons and the “recited purpose 
was pretextual” with “no convincing scientific evidence” of 
correlation between salmonella incidence or stress levels and cage 
size or stocking density.107 Rather, they asserted the statute “was 
designed to impose onerous restrictions on out-of-state egg 
producers to . . . eliminate any competitive disadvantage to 
California producers arising from California’s stifling regulatory 
environment.”108 Under their reading, AB 1437 “did not affect the 
welfare of any animal in California” nor did it “regulate any activity 
within California” but rather “applies only to egg production 
occurring outside California, and its direct impact is exclusively 
extraterritorial to California.”109 Relying on the record from the 
legislative deliberations,110 the plaintiff States asserted “[t]he sole 
102 Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 
sub nom. Missouri ex rel. Hawley v. Becerra, 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017) (quoting Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). 
103 Id. at 653. 
104 See Hawley, 137 S. Ct. at 2188. 
105 Motion For Leave To File Bill Of Complaint, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148 
(U.S. Dec. 4, 2017). 
106 LEG. OF CAL., ASSEMB. J., Reg. Sess., vol. 5, at 5961 (2009–2010). 
107 Motion For Leave To File Bill of Complaint, supra note 105, at 18.  
108 Id. at 19. 
109 Id. at 20. See also Brief of Ass’n. Des Éleveurs De Canards Et D’oies Du Québec, 
HVFG L.L.C., and Hot’s Rest. Grp., as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs at 8, Indiana 
v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (“If any of the farm animals at issue in these cases feel any 
discomfort, they do so far beyond California’s borders — and thus far beyond the State’s 
legitimate legislative reach.”). 
110 “The intent of this legislation is to level the playing field so that in-state producers are not 
disadvantaged.” Kevin De Leon, CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, BILL ANALYSIS OF AB
1437, at 1 (May 13, 2009), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_14011450/ 
ab_1437_cfa_20090512_182647_asm_comm.html [http://perma.cc/9UFY-BKB2]. 
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purpose and effect of AB 1437 was to regulate the conduct of egg 
producers outside California.”111 Additionally, they contended 
“California affronts the sovereignty of Plaintiff States” by 
dispatching inspectors to farms within their borders.112
 In its response papers, California noted that “[b]oth 
Proposition 2 and AB 1437 address activities occurring within 
California” and “AB 1437 applies uniformly (and only) to in-state 
sales, wherever the eggs may have been produced.”113 It 
distinguished AB 1437 from the price-control laws struck down in 
Healey, Brown-Forman, and Baldwin as “indifferent to how eggs 
sold in other States are produced or priced.”114 In response to the 
plaintiff States’ allegations about legislative intent to “level the 
playing field,” California argued that: 
[T]he dormant Commerce Clause forbids States from adopting measures 
that privilege in-state companies at the expense of out-of-state ones. The 
Constitution does not require a State to confer preferential treatment on 
out-of-state entities that choose to sell their products within that State, or 
to exempt those entities from the same neutral rules that apply to 
in-state sellers.115
IV. THIRTEEN STATES HAVE A COW WHEN MASSACHUSETTS 
GOVERNS VEAL
On November 8, 2016, Massachusetts, at a public referendum 
by a margin of 77.7% to 22.3%,116 adopted “An Act to Prevent 
Cruelty to Farm Animals” which prohibited the sale in 
Massachusetts, after January 1, 2022, of certain eggs, veal, and 
pork based on the conditions in which the animals were 
confined.117 The stated primary purpose of the legislation was “to 
prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm 
animal confinement which also threaten the health and safety of 
Massachusetts consumers, increase the risk of foodborne illness, 
and have negative fiscal impacts on the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.”118 In December 2017, Indiana, joined by Alabama, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin filed 
111 Reply Brief of Plaintiff States at 5–6, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148 (U.S. 
Mar. 20, 2018). 
112 Id.
113 Brief in Opposition at 1, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018). 
114 Id. at 23. 
115 Id. at 24–25. 
116 See An Act to Prevent Cruelty to Animals, VOTE SMART: FACTS MATTER,
https://votesmart.org/elections/ballot-measure/2184/an-act-to-prevent-cruelty-to-farm-
animals#.W6FtVehKg2w [http://perma.cc/G883-HRS6]. 
117 An Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals, ch. 333 (Mass. 2016),  
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2016/Chapter333 [http://perma.cc/8PBF-LZR5]. 
118 Id.
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suit before the Supreme Court.119 The plaintiff States sought to 
distinguish the justification of the “Animal Law” by reference to “the 
conditions of production simpliciter” from previously upheld laws 
concerning the quality of the products.120 They contended that, “while 
Pike balancing is appropriate where states regulate interstate 
commerce as part of a legitimate attempt to protect the health and 
safety of citizens, it does not apply where a state is simply trying to 
export its preferred public policy to other states.”121 They asserted 
the law “constitutes economic protectionism and extraterritorial 
regulation” because “farmers in Plaintiff States must now submit to 
Massachusetts’s laws, as well as those of any state that adopts 
similar regulations, in order to have access to those states’ 
markets.”122 “[W]hile Massachusetts may legitimately protect its 
consumers from harmful foodstuffs produced elsewhere, it may not 
leverage access to its markets to regulate every station in the supply 
chain of agricultural commodities.”123 The plaintiff states in the 
Massachusetts litigation argued that the regulations would force 
out-of-state farming operations to “alter their production methods 
with respect to commercial activities occurring wholly outside” 
Massachusetts and were “not directed at the quality of covered 
products but rather at the means or characteristics of production of 
such covered products.”124
In its papers, Massachusetts countered that the plaintiff 
States’ dormant Commerce Clause claims were “foreclosed by 
centuries of precedent”125 and the State’s legitimate interests in 
regulating its food supply outweighed any incidental burden on 
interstate commerce.126 Attorney General Maura Healey asserted 
that Massachusetts was “plac[ing] no special ‘burdens on the flow of 
commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those 
borders would not bear’”127 and took particular note that the statute 
only governs sales where the buyer took physical possession within 
Massachusetts, allowing noncompliant food products, and animals 
119 Motion For Leave To File A Bill Of Complaint, Indiana v. Massachusetts, No. 
22O149 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017). 
120 Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 4–5, Indiana 
v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2018).
121 Id. at 6. 
122 Bill of Complaint at 13, Indiana v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017).  
123 Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 6, Indiana 
v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017).  
124 Bill of Complaint, supra note 122, at 13. 
125 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 2, Indiana 
v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2018). 
126 Id. at 27 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
127 Id. at 28 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 
433 (2005)). 
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in cages noncompliant with the minimum-size requirements, to 
travel freely across its borders if bound for another state.128
V. FEDS: CASES DON’T MEAT STANDARDS FOR GRANT
On April 16, 2018, the Supreme Court issued Calls for the 
Views of the Solicitor General (CVSGs) in both cases.129 The 
Solicitor General responded on November 29th, 
recommending denial of the motions for leave.130 While the 
majority of the filings focused on the inappropriateness of the 
cases for an exercise of original jurisdiction as no direct 
economic injury by the defendant states had been shown,131
the government also argued that the laws were not violative of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.132 The statutes did not 
discriminate as they treated all products alike without any 
local preference,133 and assessing the health and safety 
rationales under Pike or “whether the practical effect of the 
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the 
state” would require resolution of complex factual issues best 
undertaken by the district courts.134 Additionally, the Solicitor 
General argued that the EPIA did not preempt the California 
ordinance since the USDA egg-grading standards do not 
address confinement conditions.135
Of note in their papers, the government declined to 
address the permissible scope of a cruelty rationale, suggested 
that even in the absence of discrimination a Pike analysis is 
necessary, and, possibility in a nod to Gorsuch,136 called 
“extraterritoriality” not that name, but rather, as “Baldwin
and its progeny,” which it characterized as “forbidding States 
from attempting to regulate the price of products sold in 
another State.”137
VI. HATCHING CONCLUSIONS 
The confinement statutes, which apply equally to in-state 
and out-of-state farmers, implicate neither of the concerns 
128 Id. at 28–29. 
129 Missouri v. California, 138 S. Ct. 1585 (2018) (mem.); Indiana v. Massachussetts, 
138 S. Ct. 1585 (2018) (mem.). 
130 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Indiana v. Massachusetts, No. 22O149; Brief 
for United States as Amicus Curiae, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148. 
131 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Missouri v. California, No. 22O148, 
at *8–18. 
132 Id. at *20–22.  
133 See id. at *21. 
134 See id. at *21–22.  
135 Id. at *7. 
136 See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015). 
137 See supra note 131, at *22. 
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animating modern Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence: intentional economic protectionism or the imposition 
of undue burdens.138 The California and Massachusetts legislatures 
and electorates respectively have made a policy determination that 
the animal welfare and related public health rationales for 
prohibiting the sale of products not satisfying their confinement 
standards outweigh any economic impacts or interests in those 
choices. These determinations of the public interest—that 
so confined animals are not suitable for consumption—have already 
been made and since neither statute inescapably requires any 
business to alter their practices and conduct business in other 
states in conformity with their regulations, or precludes any other 
state from regulating these products in a different manner, there is 
no justification nor need for the Court to assert its views over them. 
The California and Massachusetts statutes share many 
attributes and therefore can be considered jointly for the 
purposes of repudiating the extraterritorial attacks on their 
validity. However, despite the lack of treatment by the Solicitor 
General, the unique adoption of AB 1437 sets California apart for 
the purposes of assessing the presence of discrimination. While 
AB 1437 does not favor California egg farmers, it does benefit 
them by placing out-of-state producers on equal footing. Some 
have asked “whether the dormant Commerce Clause requires 
discrimination against in-state producers”139 and the plaintiff 
States’ argument would fault California for their political 
process—if they had passed AB 1437 without previously passing 
Prop. 2 it would not be susceptible to challenge as protectionist. 
Even though a benefit inures to in-state interests by the similar 
burdening of interstate commerce with regulations to which the 
former is already subject, the treatment is not differential and 
therefore ipso facto not discriminatory. AB 1437 does not refer 
specifically to out-of-state farms and so is a non-discriminatory 
statute, notwithstanding the pre- and ongoing existence of Prop. 
2, which the legislature is unable to formally reconcile because of 
constitutional prohibitions.140
Protectionist bans, even if partial, are “local measures for 
control and suppression of the problem [that] are in force [and] are 
138 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018). 
139 David M. Driesen, Must the States Discriminate Against Their Own Producers 
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2016). See also Nat’l 
Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 857 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To the extent that Proposition 
4 has any discriminatory effect, it would be in favor of interstate commercial activities 
undertaken by out-of-state actors.”(emphasis in original)); Reynolds v. Buchholzer, 87 
F.3d 827, 829–30 (6th Cir. 1996). 
140 See CAL. CONST. art II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative 
statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors . . . .”). 
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generally comparable in their impact to the embargo on imports.”141
California “has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly 
understood [health] risks, despite the possibility that they may 
ultimately prove to be negligible” and cannot be expected to “sit idly 
by and wait . . . until the scientific community agrees on what 
[ ] organisms are or are not dangerous before it acts to avoid such 
consequences.”142 Therefore, even if the Court were to conclude AB 
1437—because of its structuring or the legislative record—was 
protectionist, it should recognize it as falling within the bounds of 
an acceptable exception because its effects are not discriminatory. 
In the absence of discriminatory effect or intent, the Pike analysis is 
inapplicable in these cases.143 As the ordinances in question neither 
burden nor discriminate against interstate commerce, they receive 
rational basis review. The Court should be cognizant of its 
admonition in United Haulers to “not seek to reclaim 
[a Lochner-esque] ground for judicial supremacy under the banner of 
the dormant Commerce Clause” and reject the plaintiffs’ “invitations 
to rigorously scrutinize [this] legislation passed under the auspices of 
the police power.”144 The Court must be mindful to not let the 
doctrine become “a roving license for federal courts to decide what 
activities are appropriate for state and local government to 
undertake, and what activities must be the province of private 
market competition” as “the contrary approach . . . would lead to 
unprecedented and unbounded interference by the courts with state 
and local government.”145
In this diversified and international market, the clear 
majority of police power exercises are liable to implicate interstate 
commerce. However, in the absence of discrimination, the burden 
of statute borne of a legitimate public purpose “is one which the 
Constitution permits because it is an inseparable incident of the 
exercise of a legislative authority, which, under the Constitution, 
has been left to the states.”146 If the ordinances seek to prevent 
cruelty to animals occurring in the course of trade, they cannot 
be said to lack a rational basis.147 That AB 1437 “does not protect 
the welfare of any animal in California” is irrelevant; the belief 
by the state legislature that eliminating a portion of the market 
for so-confined eggs will lead to better treatment is legitimate 
141 See Regan, supra note 13, at 1270. 
142 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (discussing a Maine statute that 
prohibited the import of bait fishing). 
143 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
144 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
347 (2007). 
145 Id. at 343. 
146 S.C. St. Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938). 
147 See Cavel Int’l. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 559 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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purpose enough.148 The California and Massachusetts statutes are 
“demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic 
protectionism.”149 It has been more than three decades150 since the 
Court invalidated a statute under the “permissive” balancing 
test151 and should not start here, especially where the legitimate 
public interest, putative or otherwise, is of such great weight. The 
Solicitor General suggests that additional inquiry is necessary to 
properly perform Pike, but where statutes do not have a 
discriminatory effect, the Pike analysis is inapplicable;152 the 
confinement statutes do not regulate on the basis of location, do not 
favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests and neither 
burden nor discriminate against interstate commerce and therefore 
should only be reviewed under rational basis which they easily 
surpass. The dormant Commerce Clause is simply not implicated 
when the burdens of a regulation are borne equally by in-state 
and out-of-state interests.153
Extraterritoriality, if applied even when the challenged statute 
does not implement protectionist discrimination, is wholly divorced 
from the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause,154 and, absent 
some limiting principle, poses a broad threat to a state’s authority 
to regulate conduct with direct effects within its bounds.155 This 
over-inclusivity may indeed do damage to the principles 
animating the dormant Commerce Clause by striking down laws 
facilitating interstate commerce.156 Unlike the pre-1989 laws 
struck down by the Court under the extraterritoriality doctrine, 
these laws do not, either by their terms or effect, directly regulate 
the sale of covered animal products in other states or prevent any 
other state from regulating the same production methods 
148 See Motion For Leave To File Bill of Complaint, supra note 105, at 20; see also 
Empacadora De Carnes de Fresnillo v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 335–37 (5th Cir. 2007). 
149 Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992)). 
150 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643–46 (1982). 
151 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
347 (2007). 
152 See supra note 32–33 and accompanying text. 
153 See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) (finding that the 
prohibition on operation of retail service stations did not create any barrier to interstate 
interests and therefore did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause). 
154 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
155 See Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f 
any state regulation that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of state is per se unconstitutional, 
wouldn’t we have to strike down state health and safety regulations that require 
out-of-state manufacturers to alter their designs or labels?” (internal citation omitted)). 
156 See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378 (6th. Cir 2013) (Sutton, J., 
concurring) (“Even a hypothetical state law that facilitated interstate commerce—say, an 
Ohio law that gave tax credits to automobile companies that keep open the production lines 
of their factories in Michigan and elsewhere—would be invalid if it had extraterritorial 
‘practical effect[s].’” (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 326, 336 (1989))). 
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differently in their own jurisdiction. The simultaneous co-existence 
of the statutes challenged in these suits undermines any claim 
that each statute disrupts a national scheme. While evolving 
production standards may raise the specter of conflicting regimes, 
it is not a court’s place to assume hypotheticals.157 While the 
passage of price affirmation statutes in every state would result in 
“competing and interlocking local economic regulation,”158 passage 
of confinement standards would result in national uniformity. To 
the extent one regime remains more restrictive than the others, it 
is up to each interstate market participant to determine for itself 
whether to comply with the most stringent and therefore continue 
to serve all states or narrow the jurisdictions in which they 
participate.159 While out-of-state egg and hog farmers may choose 
to alter their production methods with regard to products for sale 
in other states—transactions in which California and 
Massachusetts have no interest—to avoid the costs of two distinct 
systems or spread the costs more broadly, nothing in either statute 
requires such meaning that such impacts are not “inescapable.”160
It is incumbent on the Court to “surrende[r] former views”161 of 
“heightened . . . stare decisis in the dormant Commerce Clause 
context”162 “to a better considered position”163 and recognize the 
dormancy of the presently conceived dormant Commerce Clause 
tests. Only by narrowing them to more closely reflect the 
interconnected realities of the present global economy will they do 
justice to the competing goals of federalism: state sovereignty and 
the equality of state law.164
157 See Regan, supra note 13, at 1148. 
158 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 326, 336 (1989).
159 See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773, 795 (1945) (invalidating state train 
length law and noting that the alternative to breaking up trains at state borders “is for 
the carrier to conform to the lowest train limit restriction of any of the states through 
which its trains pass, whose laws thus control the carriers’ operations both within and 
without the regulating state”); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. 
v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) 
Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1881 (1987) (“The commercial 
enterprise that chooses to operate in more than one state must simply be prepared to 
confirm its various local operations to more than one set of laws. The Constitution does 
not give an enterprise any special privileges just because it happens to operate across 
state lines.”). 
160 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
161 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(quoting McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
162 Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
163 Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 
162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
164 See Schmitt, supra note 46, at 426. 
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